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Abstract
We compare the performance of two learning algorithms in replicating
individual short and long-run expectations: the Exploration-Explotation Al-
gorithm (EEA) and the Heuristic Switching Model (HSM). Individual expec-
tations are elicited in a series of Learning-to-Forecast Experiments (LtFEs)
with different feedback mechanisms between expectations and market price:
positive and negative feedback markets. We implement the EEA proposed
by Colasante et al. (2018c). Moreover, we modify the existing version of the
HSM in order to incorporate the long-run predictions. Although the two
algorithms provide a fairly good description of marker prices in the short-
run, the EEA outperforms the HSM in replicating the main characteristics
of individual expectation in the long-run, both in terms of coordination of
individual expectations and convergence of expectations to the fundamental
value.
JEL: D03,G12,C91.
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1 Introduction
The origin of heterogeneity across individual expectations and the role that it
plays in shaping aggregate outcomes is an important topic in theoretical as well
as empirical research in macroeconomics. Expectations, however, are not directly
observable, differently from prices of stocks, volumes of sold books, interest rates of
bonds, downloads or number of likes, which can be precisely measured and recorded
in the new world where almost “everything” is now in electronic format. This
means that there is a significant limitation when it comes to fully understanding the
precise role played by expectations in driving macroeconomic aggregates. One way
to circumvent this problem and rigorously model the expectations of individuals is
to assume consistent expectations, i.e. rational expectations, following the seminal
idea of Muth (1961) which has been further developed by Lucas Jr and Prescott
(1971). From a formal point of view, the main advantage of rational expectations
is that agents can be rational in one way only. The argument put forward by
Friedman (1966) on the irrelevance of “irrational” individuals in the long-run gives
to the rationality assumption a further intuitive appeal.
As an alternative to the rational expectations paradigm, it certainly plays a
central role the bounded rationality assumption of economic agents, introduced
by Simon (1957). In the world of bounded rational agents, we typically loose the
uniqueness of the behavior, since agents can be “non-rational” in many different
ways. In order to shed some light on the degree of bounded rationality of indi-
viduals, laboratory experiments have been largely demonstrated to be an essential
methodology. Countless experiments have repetitively shown that in complex en-
vironments, subjects follow simple adaptive rules, called heuristics, in order to
form expectations, changing their mind as a function of the evolution of the en-
vironment and adapting to the new circumstances. The principle of anchor and
adjustment, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1973), is a sufficiently general
and flexible framework that can be certainly cast into the bounded rationality
paradigm and able to realistically describe the way individuals form and adapt
their expectations.
Laboratory experiments is one of the methodologies that allows us to directly
elicit individual expectations using performance-based incentives. In particular,
within the experimental literature, Learning-to-Forecat Experiments, in the fol-
lowing LtFEs, (see Marimon et al. (1993)), are designed to study the formation of
individual expectations within different expectations feedback systems in a market
where the price depends on subjects’ (short-run) predictions. Such experimental
framework allows to study under which conditions individual predictions converge
to the rational expectations equilibrium. Moreover, it allows to efficiently test
alternative formulations of expectation formation models. A large number of Lt-
FEs have been conducted to analyse the way individuals form and adapt their
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short-run expectations in different economic environments: in financial markets
(Hommes et al. (2005)), real estate markets (Bao and Ding (2016)), commodity
markets (Bao et al. (2013)) and in simple macroeconomic frameworks (Assenza
et al. (2011); Anufriev et al. (2013); Cornand and M’baye (2016)). The vast ma-
jority of those LtFEs focuses on eliciting individual short-run expectations, i.e.
providing incentives to forecast the next period market price. The novel contri-
bution to this experimental literature of Colasante et al. (2018a,b) is to focus on
the entire spectrum of expectations, since they elicit contemporaneously short and
long-run expectations about the evolution of the market price under positive and
negative feedback systems. In particular, they explicitly give incentives to the
subjects to submit their predictions on the market price at the beginning of every
period, giving the possibility to revise the predictions as new information becomes
available. This experimental design allows to study how expectations form and
co-evolve with the price at different forecast horizons. Their results concerning
short-run predictions are in line with the literature (see Heemeijer et al. (2009)):
fast convergence and slow coordination in the markets with negative feedback,
whereas slow convergence and fast coordination in the markets with positive feed-
back. Regarding the long-run predictions, Colasante et al. (2018a,b) observe that
in markets with positive feedback treatments the market price plays a pivotal role
in the expectations formation process, whereas in markets with negative feedback
it turns out that subjects use the fundamental value as their main reference point.
We can find in the literature only few computational learning algorithms to
describe individual expectations in LtFEs (see Heemeijer et al. (2009); Assenza
et al. (2011); Bao et al. (2013); Hommes and Lux (2013)). The most commonly
used is the so-called Heuristic Switching Model, HSM hereafter (see Brock and
Hommes (1998)). Using experimental data on long-run expectations, Colasante
et al. (2018c) have introduced an alternative adaptive learning model of bounded
rationality, the Exploration-Exploitation Algorithm (hereafter EEA) that, con-
trary to the HSM, accounts contemporaneously for subjects’ short- and long-run
expectations.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the performance of the EEA and the HSM
to reproduce the long-run expectations in markets with positive and negative feed-
back. Since the original version of the HSM can account for short-run expectations
only, we introduce a modified version of the HSM in order to capture the short- as
well as long-run expectations. We take the position that comparing the capabil-
ity of different algorithms in describing the dynamical properties of the formation
mechanism of individual expectations is a valuable contribution. It helps, in fact,
by confronting the basic constituents of the algorithms, to understand which are
the crucial determinants in designing reliable models of expectations formation.
Furthermore, it allows to devise new models by possibly combining the crucial
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characteristics of the analysed algorithms in an more efficient architecture, to de-
scribe the date and model expectations.
The paper is organized as follows: in the Section 2, we illustrate the experimen-
tal setting of the LtFE and the experimental results. In Section 3, we describe the
details of the two learning algorithms, namely the HSM and its modified version
and the EEA. In Sections 4 and 5, we describe the simulation results and propose
a modified version of the EEA to include a different anchor, respectively. Finally,
in Section 6 we present the main conclusions.
2 The Learning to Forecast Experiment
2.1 Experimental Design
This paper builds upon the Learning to Forecast Experiments of Colasante et al.
(2018a,b). In this section we briefly describe their novel experimental design to
elicit subjects’ expectations at different time horizons. In those LtFEs the authors
elicit subjects’ short and long-run expectations in markets characterized by either
a positive or a negative expectations feedback system. They conduct a total of
15 sessions: 7 with positive and 8 with negative feedback. In each session, 6
subjects play the role of professional forecasters for 20 periods. More precisely,
at the beginning of period t, subject i submits her short-run prediction for the
price at the end of period t, denoted as ip
e
t,t, as well as her long-run predictions
for the price at the end of each one of the 20 − t remaining periods, denoted as
ip
e
t,t+k, with 1 ≤ k ≤ 20 − t. To compute the market price, it is implemented the
pricing equation proposed by Heemeijer et al. (2009). In the positive feedback
treatment, the law of motion of the price is given by:
pt = pf +
1
1 + r
(p¯et,t − pf ) + t , (1)
while in the negative feedback treatment the realized market price is computed as
follows:
pt = pf − 1
1 + r
(p¯et,t − pf ) + t , (2)
where r= 0.05 in all sessions and pf is the constant fundamental value in a given
session.1 The term p¯et,t in the equations is the average of the six one-step-ahead
1To avoid the effects of communication among subjects between sessions, two different values
for pf are implemented, so that there are some markets with a fundamental value equal to 65 and
others with a fundamental value equal to 70. In the positive feedback treatment, the fundamental
value is computed as pf =
d
r , where the average dividend d is equal to 3.5 or 3.25, depending on
the session.
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predictions submitted at the beginning of period t, p¯et,t =
1
6
∑6
i=1 ip
e
t,t. Finally, the
term t ∼ N(0, 0.25) is an iid normal shock.
The main difference between eqs. (1) and (2) is how expectations affect the
price: eq. (1) describes a positive feedback system where subjects predictions are
self-fulfilling, i.e. the higher (lower) is the average forecast, the higher (lower) will
be the price. Eq. (2) describes, instead, a system in which there is a negative feed-
back between expectations and price, i.e. the higher (lower) is the average forecast,
the lower (higher) will be the price. Even if market price is solely determined by
short-run predictions, all predictions are rewarded. Individual earnings at the end
of each period depend on forecasting errors and are computed as ipit = ipi
s
t + ipi
l
t,
where ipi
s
t denotes the pay-off for the short-run predictions:
ipi
s
t =
250
1 + βi,t
with βi,t =
(
ip
e
t,t − pt
2
)2
. (3)
and ipi
l
t denotes the subject’s pay-off that depends on her long-run predictions error,
being ipi
l
t =
∑t−1
j=1 ipi
l
t−j,t, where ipi
l
t−j,t represents the individual profit associated
with the prediction submitted by subject i at the beginning of period t− j for the
price in period t, where 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1. The long-run predictions are rewarded
according to the following scheme:
ipi
l
t−j,t =

25 if 0 ≤ iδt−j,t ≤ 5
12 if 5 < iδt−j,t ≤ 10
5 if 10 < iδt−j,t ≤ 15
0 otherwise
(4)
where iδt−j,t = |ipet−j,t − pt|. Note that subjects receive an immediate feedback on
their short-run forecasting accuracy, while they experience a delay in evaluating
the accuracy of their long-run predictions. The final payment of each subject is the
sum of pay-offs across all periods.2 In the positive feedback treatment, subjects
are informed about the value of the constant interest rate (r), average dividend
(d), the asset prices until period t− 1 and all their own (short and long-run) past
predictions. In the negative feedback, subjects receive only information about
their own past predictions and the past market prices. As it is typically done
in the literature of LtFEs, the subjects receive some qualitative information on
the feedback system affecting the price mechanism and the profit functions. See
Colasante et al. (2018a,b) for additional details about the experimental design.
2The parameters of the pay-off functions are calibrated such that approximately
max
∑20
t=1 ipi
s
t = max
∑20
t=1 ipi
l
t, in order to give to the subjects the same incentive to provide
accurate predictions in the short as well as in the long-run.
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According to eqs. (1) and (2), the REE predicts that the price pt converges to
the fundamental value with fairly small fluctuations proportional to the idiosyn-
cratic shock term t. What would be the REE for long-run expectations? When
eliciting their long-run expectations, subjects submit at the beginning of period t
their predictions for the end of period t + k, for all k > 0. The price at the end
of period t + k is a function of the subjects’ short-run predictions submitted at
the beginning of period t + k. Each subject has, indeed, to guestimate k-periods
in advance, the short-run predictions of the other subjects. If we assume that all
subjects follow rational expectations, then their predictions in each period t and
for each forecast horizon k are are ip
e
t,t+k ≈ pf , independently of the expectations
feedback system.
2.2 Experimental results
In the following we summarize the experimental results in Colasante et al. (2018a).
Figure 1 displays the dynamics of the market price in all the 15 markets. As an
illustrative example, Figures 2 and 3 show the individual short-run predictions and
the market price dynamics in two representative group for each treatment. From
a visual inspection of those figures, we observe that market prices follow qual-
itatively different patterns, depending on the feedback mechanism implemented
in the particular treatment. In the positive feedback treatment, short-run pre-
dictions coordinate after few periods, although not necessary to the fundamental
value. The market price exhibits an oscillatory pattern without converging to
the fundamental value. In the negative feedback treatment, instead, we observe
that market prices quickly converge to the fundamental value after few periods
of uneven fluctuations, while individual short-run predictions need more periods
to coordinate on the fundamental value. Figures 4 and 5 show individual long-
run predictions in two representative groups, one for the positive and one for the
negative feedback treatment, respectively.
To quantify the convergence of the expectations, the Mean Absolute Deviation
(MAD) between individual predictions and the fundamental value is computed for
both, short and long-run predictions as:
MAD
pf
t,t+k =
〈∑6
i=1 |ipet,t+k − pf |
6
〉
g
, (5)
with k=0,1,2,4,6,9. The notation < ... >g denotes the average across groups. To
quantify the degree of coordination, the MAD between individual predictions and
the (within-group) average predictions is computed for each period t and for a
given forecast horizon k, with k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9:
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Figure 1: Realized price for all groups in the two treatments. The blue solid lines
are market prices, the dashed lines represent the fundamental value.
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Figure 2: Realized price and individual short-run predictions of two representative
groups in the positive feedback system. The black solid line is the market price,
the grey lines are the individual one-step-ahead predictions and the dashed line
represents the fundamental value.
MADCt,t+k =
〈∑6
i=1 |ipet,t+k − p¯et,t+k|
6
〉
g
, (6)
Figure 6 summarizes the main results in terms of both convergence and co-
ordination. A comparison between treatments in terms of convergence leads to a
well-known conclusion in line with the LtFE literature (see Heemeijer et al. (2009)):
the predictions for different forecasting horizons converge to the fundamental value
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Figure 3: Realized price and individual short-run predictions of two representative
groups in the negative feedback system. The black solid line is the market price,
the grey lines are the individual one-step-ahead predictions and the dashed line
represents the fundamental value.
only in the negative feedback treatment, while, in the positive feedback treat-
ment, predictions systematically deviate from the fundamental value. Focusing
on coordination of expectations, in the positive feedback treatment, subjects’ one
step-ahead predictions coordinate faster than in the negative feedback treatment,
whereas in the long-run predictions, the forecasts disagreement increases with the
horizon, i.e. the longer is the forecast horizon, the higher is the dispersion of
predictions. This is strongly connected to the absence of a long-term anchor for
subjects’ expectations. In fact, the long-run predictions are characterized by some
sort of cone-shape trajectory, compatible with a linear trend extrapolation rule of
subjects with heterogeneous slopes. In the negative feedback treatment, where sub-
jects learn the fundamental value, coordination of short and long-run predictions
occur simultaneously, driven by the converge of the market price to the funda-
mental value. Subjects are able to learn the REE and, as a consequence, both
price and expectations converge to it over time. It is just in the negative feedback
system that the REE constitutes a good benchmark to describe the market price
dynamics and the evolution of subjects’ expectations.
3 Learning Algorithms: HSM and EEA
In this section we describe the details of the two learning algorithms that we
employ to reproduce the experimental data.
The HSM is a well-established learning algorithm implemented to explain sub-
jects’ behavior in many LtFEs, see Assenza et al. (2014) and Hommes (2018).
According to this model, subjects forecast future prices by selecting a prediction
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Figure 4: Realized prices (dots), the asset fundamental value (broken line) and all
individual predictions (solid lines), submitted from period 1 to 15 of Group 1 in
the positive feedback treatment, as a function of the time horizon.
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Figure 5: Realized prices (dots), the asset fundamental value (broken line) and all
individual predictions (solid lines), submitted from period 1 to 15 of Group 1 in
the negative feedback treatment, as a function of the time horizon.
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Figure 6: Convergence and coordination of short and long-run expectations in the
positive and negative feedback treatments.
rule that best performed in the recent past among a given set of simple heuristics.
The process of learning is based on the feedback they receive from their profits,
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which constitutes a fitness measure to rank those rules. In every period, each
subject selects the rules with a probability proportional to the fitness measure,
so that the best performing rule has higher chances to be selected. Similarly to
the HSM, the EEA is based on the very basic principle of anchor-and-adjustment,
(Kahneman and Tversky (1973)). Differently from the HSM which can be thought
as a “parametric” learning algorithm, the EEA allows a higher degree of flexibil-
ity in the range of possible prediction rules, see Colasante et al. (2018c). Its key
learning mechanism is the identification of the range of feasible actions around
the anchor, represented by the market price in the previous period. As long as
more information on the price dynamics is available, each subject adjusts her own
range of possible predictions and, then, selects her specific prediction proportion-
ally to the fitness measure. The process of selection consists of two main phases:
the exploration phase, in which subjects have few information and try to form
their expectations about the future evolution of the market price; the exploitation
phase, in which subjects refine their predictions in order to locally “optimize” their
performance. Note that in the EEA we are not imposing any precise parametriza-
tion of the subjects’ predictions, which are free to vary in a range whose evolution
adapts to the past market conditions.
3.0.1 The Heuristic Switching Model
In the following, we list the four heuristics of the HSM as introduced by Bao et al.
(2012). We label the four rules according to the index h = 1, .., 4, indicating the
corresponding forecasting price as hp
e
t,t. Note that the left sub-index h denotes
now the heuristic instead of the subject. The heuristics are3:
• Adaptive rule (ADA):
1p
e
t,t = αpt−1 + (1− α)pet−1,t−1 0 < α < 1 . (7)
• Trend following rule (TFR):
2p
e
t,t = pt−1 + w(pt−1 − pt−2) w > 0 . (8)
• Contrarian rule (CR):
3p
e
t,t = pt−1 + s(pt−1 − pt−2) s < 0 . (9)
• Learning and adjustment rule (LAA):
4p
e
t,t = 0.5(p
av
t−1 + pt−1) + (pt−1 − pt−2)
3For a detailed description of the rules, their meaning and performances we refer the reader
to the pertinent literature.
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The learning mechanism is based on the possibility for the subjects to switch
among the four given rules, choosing the one providing the relatively highest prof-
itability in the recent past. The following equation is employed to compute the
performance of each heuristic:
Uh,t−1 = −
(
pt−1 − hpet−1,t−1
)2
+ η Uh,t−2, h = 1, ..., 4 ,
where the parameter 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 represents the “memory” of agents, meaning the
weight assigned to past errors. We set η = 0.7, following Hommes (2013).
It is assumed that only a fraction of agents changes their rule every period.
The share of agents using a specific rule is computed by using the discrete choice
model with asynchronous updating as in Diks and Van Der Weide (2005):
nh,t = δ nh,t−1 + (1− δ) exp(β Uh,t−1)
Zt−1
, (10)
Zt−1 =
4∑
h=1
exp(β Uh,t−1) , (11)
where 0 < δ ≤ 1 denotes the share of agents that update their choice; the param-
eter β ≥ 0 represents the intensity of choice and it determines the switching speed
to the most successful rule. Zt−1 is a normalization factor. As in Hommes (2013),
we consider δ = 0.9 and β = 0.4. We compute the expected price as a weighted
average across the different expectations given by the four rules:
p¯et,t =
4∑
h=1
nh,t−1 hpet,t .
Plugging the value of p¯et,t into eqs. (1) and (2), we compute the market price, in
the positive and negative feedback treatment, respectively.
We generalize the HSM in order to account for the long-run expectations. We
simply assume that the subjects linearly extrapolate their short-run prediction
rules to determine their long-run expectations as follows:
• Long-run adaptive rule (L-ADA):
1p
e
t,t+k = pt−1 + (k + 1) α(pt − pet−1,t−1) k = 1, 2, 3 . (12)
• Long-run trend following rule (L-TFR):
2p
e
t,t = pt−1 + (k + 1) w(pt−1 − pt−2) k = 1, 2, 3 . (13)
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• Long-run contrarian rule (L-CR):
3p
e
t,t = pt−1 + (k + 1) s(pt−1 − pt−2) k = 1, 2, 3 .
• Long-run learning and adjustment rule (L-LAA):
4p
e
t,t = 0.5(p
av
t−1 + pt−1) + (k + 1)(pt−1 − pt−2) k = 1, 2, 3 .
We assume that, once an agent selects one of the short-run prediction rules, she
extrapolates linearly that rule in order to predict prices in horizons up to 4-steps
ahead. In other words, we assume that the selection of the rule at time t is based
on the feedback from the profits associated to the short-run predictions only. Our
simple modification of the HSM to account for long-run predictions is the first step
in this direction present in the literature on LtFEs. It is essentially based a simple
intuition and in its easy implementation.
3.0.2 The EEA: the Exploration-Exploitation Algorithm
The Exploration-Exploitation Algorithm, as outlined in Colasante et al. (2018c),
is a non parametric learning algorithm implemented to characterize the price dy-
namics of both, short- and long-run expectation in LtFEs. We assume that each
subject, represented by and artificial agent, has a set of available actions in ev-
ery period. To compute short-run predictions, the range of action of the artificial
agents evolves adaptively as a function of the past price and expectations. In
particular, the range of the set of actions is centred in the last realized price and
its range, which represents the exploration space, is proportional to the standard
deviation of the past market prices. The probability to take a particular action is
proportional to a given distribution, with mean computed as a convex combina-
tion between the last observed price and its past prediction, and whose range of
variability is proportional to the standard deviation of the market price. During
the experiment, the range of variability of subjects’ predictions diminishes over
time, from a very high level of dispersion in the first few periods, to a very narrow
band at the end of the experiment, see Figure 6b. Within the EEA, the behavior
of the subjects can be cast into two distinct phases: (i) the exploration phase, i.e.
th tendency to explore the range of actions to acquire knowledge on their environ-
ment and (ii) the exploitation phase, i.e. learning to coordinate their actions using
the acquired information on the price generating process in order ot gain higher
profits. In the second phase the range of actions significantly reduces around the
last market price.
Let us formalize the EEA algorithm. All agents are characterized by a set
of n = 101 feasible actions, At = {a1t, a2t, ..., ant}, where a1t < a2t < ... < ant
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and ajt denotes the single element in the set. The set At changes every period
depending on the last realized price and the magnitude of the fluctuations of
past prices. More precisely, the range of the set of actions lies in the interval
(pt−1 − 5Λt−1, pt−1 + 5Λt−1), and it is common to all agents, where Λt−1 is the
standard deviation of the last three market prices. In each period t, agent i selects
an action ia˜t ≡ ipet,t from At, that corresponds to its prediction of the price for the
end of period t, i.e. its one-step-ahead prediction.
Agent i chooses three additional actions ia˜
k
t ≡ ipet,t+k from the corresponding
set of actions Akt = {ak1t, ak2t, ..., aknt}, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. They represent the
spectrum of agent i’s long-run expectations up to four-steps-ahead. The interval
of variability of the range of Akt is centred in pt−1, similarly to the case of short-
run predictions, with a constant width independent of the evolution of the price.
The maximum range for the agents’ long-run predictions is 15, similar to the
maximum deviation of a long-run prediction to be rewarded with a positive profit
in the experiment, see eq. (4). The range of the actions that belongs to Akt is
therefore (pt−1 − 15, pt−1 + 15).4 Once all agents choose their actions, the price is
computed according to eqs. (1) and (2).
Agents, then, evaluate the performance of all feasible actions using a fitness
function that accounts for the last realized price as an anchor and their last predic-
tions. We introduce two different measures: Vt to evaluate the individual actions
in the set At (short-run predictions); V
k
t to evaluate the individual actions in the
sets Akt (long-run predictions). The value of the fitness measures are:
iVj,t = (pt−1 − iajt)2 + φs (ipet−1,t−1 − iajt)2 , (14)
iV
k
j,t = |pt−1 − iakjt|+ φl |ipet−k−1,t−1 − iakjt| . (15)
We can interpret these fitness measures as a sort of adaptive adjustment of the
expectations. The parameters φs and φl constitute the relative weights assigned
to the past prediction with respect to the last realized price. Note that, in the
fitness functions, we reproduce the structure of the payoff function of eqs. (3) and
(4), a quadratic term to evaluate short-run predictions, and a term proportional
to the absolute distance to evaluate the subject’s long-run predictions. We then
introduce a probability distribution over the range of the possible actions of each
agent i. Essentially, all agents have the same set of actions, however the fitness
measures and the associated probability distributions are different among agents,
depending on their individual past performance. Let iPjt be the probability that
agent i selects action iajt (i.e. a short-run prediction) from the set At, such that
0 ≤ iPjt ≤ 1 and
∑101
j=1 iPjt = 1. The probability to select action iajt is computed
4Note that, if we exclude the peculiarity of the first period, the empirical data on long-run
predictions lie always in that interval.
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as:
iPjt =
exp(−γ · iVj,t)∑101
l=1 exp(−γ · iVl,t)
, (16)
where γ ∈ [0,∞) represents the intensity of choice. It determines the way an agent
ranks the relative performance of its actions. We introduce the following formula
for the long-run predictions:
iP
k
jt =
exp(−γ · iVkj,t)∑101
j=l exp(−γ · iVkl,t)
. (17)
According to the probability distributions in eqs. (16) and (17), each agent ran-
domly chooses four actions ia˜t and ia˜
k
t , where k ∈ {1, 2, 3} (one short-run predic-
tion and three long-run predictions) in each period t.
3.1 Calibration of the learning algorithms
3.1.1 HSM calibration
In order to calibrate the extrapolative trend parameters of the heuristics, we run
the regressions given by eqs. (7) and (8) on the time series of predictions of each
individual subject.5 For the adaptive rule, we obtain similar results in the two
treatments (see Tables 1 and 2). Interestingly, in the negative feedback treat-
ment the majority of subject adopts a contrarian behavior, i.e. subjects form
their predictions by assigning a negative coefficient to the observed trend. The
extrapolative parameter of the TFR is equal to the average of all the estimated
significant coefficients for the positive feedback treatment. We follow the same
procedure for the negative feedback treatment to compute the parameter of the
CR. In order to simulate the HSM, we use the following common specification:
α = 0.63, w = 0.44 and s = −0.44. Note that we decide not to implement exactly
the heuristics described in the original paper by Anufriev and Hommes (2012).
Table 1: Estimated parameter of the ADA rule and the TFR/CR rule for the
positive feedback treatment. The mean is the average across significant coefficients.
Equation Parameters
Mean Min Max SD
ADA 0.65 0.21 0.9 0.19
TFR/CR 0.48 -0.34 1.3 0.66
5Note that we eliminate the restriction on the parameter w in eq. (8), so that it can take any
real value.
16
Table 2: Estimated parameter of the ADA rule and the TFR/CR rule for the neg-
ative feedback treatment. The mean is the average across significant coefficients.
Equation Parameters
Mean Min Max SD
ADA 0.61 0.3 0.9 0.16
TFR/CR -0.4 -0.84 0.43 0.31
3.1.2 EEA calibration
We can estimate the main parameters of the EEA algorithm, namely φs, γ and φl,
for each subject using the maximum likelihood procedure. The two parameters
related to the short-run predictions can be expressed in a close-form, while for
φl we rely on a numerical optimization. The probability distribution for one-step
ahead predictions of eq. (16) can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution,
whose parameters can be expressed as:
iµt−1 =
pt−1 + iφs ipet−1,t−1
(1 + iφs)
, (18)
σ2i =
1
2 γi (1 + iφs)
. (19)
The mean iµt−1 is determined the past prediction and past market price with
a given weight (φs). The variance is invariant over time and depends on the
given subject. By rearranging eq. (18), it is possible to express the mean of the
distribution as a convex combination between past expectations and past market
price:
iµt−1 = (1− αi)pt−1 + αi ipet−1,t−1 , (20)
where the weight is given by αi =
iφs
1 + iφs
(note that iφs > −1). Estimating
iφs gives us information on how subjects adjust their short-run expectations over
time. According to the values for iφs, subjects combine in different ways past
predictions and prices. In particular, we identify the following behaviors: (i)
0 < iφs < 1 translates in 0 < αi < 1/2 so that subjects try to adjust their future
predictions towards the market price; (ii) a value of iφs > 1 implies αi >
1
2
and,
as a consequence, subjects forecast values closed to previous predictions; (iii) for
negative values of iφs subjects “overcorrect” their past expectations by submitting
predictions opposite to either market price
(−1
2
< iφs < 0
)
or past predictions(−1
2
< iφs < −13
)
. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the estimated values of iφˆs
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(panel a), γˆi (panel b) and iφˆl (panel c) for both positive and negative feedback
treatments.
In Table 3, we classify the subjects6 according to the above mentioned be-
haviors. As can be seen, future predictions are computed differently depending
on whether subjects participate in a positive or negative feedback treatment. In
the positive feedback treatment, almost half of the subjects “overcorrect” their
forecasts (18 out of 40) either towards pt−1 or ipet−1,t−1. In the negative feedback
treatment, the large majority of subjects (30 out of 44) adjust their predictions to
be close to the market price. Interestingly, only a negligible minority (6 out of 44)
take into account past expectations.
Table 3: Classification of subjects across the different expectation formation rules.
iφs αi Expectation formation rule positive feedback negative feedback
0 < iφs < 1 0 < αi <
1
2
smooth correction towards pt−1 14 30
iφs > 1 αi >
1
2
smooth correction towards ip
e
t−1,t−1 8 8
−1
3
< iφs < 0 −1
2
< αi < 0 overcorrection towards pt−1 12 6
−1
2
< iφs < −1
3
−1 < αi < −1
2
overcorrection towards ip
e
t−1,t−1 6 0
For the long-run expectations we estimate the individual values of iφl, common
for two, three and four-steps-ahead predictions of a given subject, and use the
value of γi obtained from short-run expectations. In order to simulate the EEA
we use the following set of parameters φs = 0.4, φl = 1.4 and γ = 0.4 for the
positive feedback treatment; φs = 0.15, φl = 1.4 and γ = 0.4 for the negative
feedback treatment. Note that those values are the median values of the estimated
coefficients.
4 Simulation results
After a comprehensive description of the two algorithms, in this section we compare
their performance in replicating the experimental results in markets with positive
and negative feedback and for short- as well as long-run expectations.
6We have eliminated the estimates of six subjects because of the estimated values of iφs are
out of range due to an error in typing their predictions, two in the positive feedback and four in
the negative treatment.
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Figure 7: Distribution of the estimated individual values for iφs, γi and iφl. Blue
bars refer to Negative feedback and red striped bars refers to Positive feedback.
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4.1 Comparing the HSM and EEA to describe short-run
expectations
In order to simulate the HSM, in the first three periods we use the experimental
data to initiate the algorithm, assigning the same weight to each rule, i.e. nh,1 =
0.25,∀h. Starting from period three, we compute the fitness measure and the
weights nh,3 associated to each heuristic. For the subsequent periods we iterate
the algorithm detailed in the previous section.
In order to initiate the EEA algorithm, we use the experimental individual
predictions and the first three realized prices, since the range of the action sets
depends on the three past realized prices. Individual predictions are independent
realizations from different distributions, so that we have six (the number of subjects
in the group) different distributions and six predictions in every period and for
every group. Once the short-term predictions are determined, we compute the
market price by using either eq. (1) or eq. (2) according to the treatment the
group belongs to.
Figures 8 and 9 show the simulated market prices compared to the experimental
market prices for all groups in positive and negative feedback treatment, respec-
tively. From a preliminary inspection, both algorithms perform well in replicating
experimental prices in the two treatments. Table 4 displays the values of the Mean
Squared Error (MSE) for the two algorithms. The ability to foresight experimental
prices is similar for both algorithms. Interestingly, we observe a systematic higher
value of the MSE in the negative feedback treatment compared to the positive
treatment. Thus, it seems that both algorithms are able to better capture the
price time series in the positive than in the negative feedback treatment. This
is in line with the literature on the application of the HSM in reproducing the
experimental data.
The two algorithms can fairly well reproduce the stylized facts regarding the
mutual coordination of expectations and convergence to the fundamental value,
described in section 2.2. Figures 17 and 16 compare the experimental data with
the simulated data from the two algorithms. Both algorithms capture the faster
coordination of short-term predictions in the positive feedback markets as com-
pared to the negative feedback markets. At the same time, the HSM and EEA
can reproduce the convergence to the REE of the short-term expectations in the
negative feedback treatment. In the positive feedback treatment, both prices and
predictions are not converging to the fundamental value, which is well captured
by the two algorithms.
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Figure 8: Simulation results based on the HSM and the EEA in the positive
feedback treatment. The continuous black line is the experimental market price,
the blue line is the market price generated using the HSM and the dashed grey
line is the market price generated using the EEA.
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Figure 9: Simulation results based on the HSM and the EEA in the negative
feedback treatment. The continuous black line is the experimental market price,
the blue line is the market price generated using the HSM and the dashed grey
line is the market price generated using the EEA.
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Table 4: Mean Squared Error of the HSM and EEA in describing the time series
of experimental market prices.
Positive Negative
HSM EEA HSM EEA
Group 1 0.46 0.29 1.50 0.46
Group 2 0.22 0.06 0.97 3.21
Group 3 0.94 0.13 0.32 0.75
Group 4 0.99 0.13 2.00 1.84
Group 5 0.17 0.38 0.67 0.61
Group 6 0.48 0.16 2.16 1.77
Group 7 0.98 0.77 2.18 1.03
Group 8 - - 0.69 2.07
4.2 Comparing the HSM and EEA to describe long-run
expectations
One interesting contribution of the paper is the extension of the HSM in order to
describe long-term expectations, with a simple linear extrapolative modification
of the existing heuristics. The comparison with the EEA and its extension can
give a rough idea of the goodness of the modified HSM in reproducing the long
term-expectations. This is a relevant step to have a reliable framework to model
long-term expectations in a realistic environment.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt in the literature on
LtFEs to reproduce individual long-run expectations using the HSM. Despite the
fact that in the experiment subjects submit in each period t their expectations
for the remaining 20 − t periods, we replicate the individual expectations up to
four steps ahead. Our choice represents a good compromise between considering
the whole time-span and having a sufficient statistics to analyse the properties of
the two algorithms as a function of the time horizon and comparing them to the
experimental data.
We study the performance of the two algorithms in replicating the main statisti-
cal properties of the experimental data, namely (i) the time series of the individual
long-term expectations, (ii) the coordination of long-term predictions as a func-
tion of the time horizon and (iii) the convergence of long-run expectations to the
fundamental value. It is worth mentioning that we do not have an aggregate vari-
able as the market price for the long-run predictions, but just individual long-run
predictions. When necessary, therefore, we rely on the average of the long-run
expectations.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the evolution of the average long-run expectations
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(across subjects) for 2, 3 and 4 steps ahead in the case of positive and negative
feedback treatments. Once again, both algorithms seems to replicate the experi-
mental data with a reasonable accuracy. Figures from 12 to 15 show the evolution
of individual long run expectations in a representative group in the two treatments
and for the two algorithms. A first glance, those figures shows that the individual
long-run expectations generated by the two algorithms resemble the experimen-
tal elicited expectations. In particular, we can observe in the positive feedback
treatment, the cone-shape form of the predictions submitted in a given period as
a function on the increasing time horizon. In the negative feedback treatment, we
can observe the dynamical process of convergence to the REE of short- as well as
long-run predictions.
In order to have a more quantitative comparison between the two algorithms,
Tables 5 and 6 show the mean squared error of the simulated data (averaged over
100 Monte Carlo simulations) in describing the average long-run expectations. The
EEA describes significantly better the long-run predictions than the modified HSM
with the linear extrapolation heuristics.
In Figures 16 and 17, we compare the dynamical properties of the mutual
coordination of long-run expectations and their convergence to the fundamental
value. At a first inspection, it seems that the two algorithms are able to fairly well
replicate the behavior of the experimental data, since the degree of coordination
resulting from the simulated data is fairly close to the degree of coordination of
experimental data. Additionally, the EEA and the HSM are capable of repro-
ducing the more persistent heterogeneity observed for the long-run predictions as
compared to the degree of coordination of the one-step-ahead predictions. A closer
look at the behavior of the dispersion (measured with the MAD) of the long-run
expectations as a function of the time horizon (panel (c) of Figure 16) shows that it
increases linearly with the time horizon. This tendency is systematic in both, the
negative and the positive feedback treatments. In the positive treatment, such lin-
ear beahvior is similar to the empirical data. In the negative feedback treatment,
instead, such increase of the dispersion over the horizons is much less evident, with
some periods showing an absence of such a systematic increasing tendency.
Note that the HSM with the linear extrapolative trend for the long-run pre-
dictions has built-in such characteristics. Any (linear) measure of dispersion of
the predictions as a function of the time horizon will, therefore, exhibit a linear
increase. This property is counter factual if we consider the negative feedback
treatment. It is intuitive, in fact, that a simple linear extrapolation of prices can-
not predict convergent prices to the fundamental value. Our numerical exercise,
thus, shows that a the HSM should be modified with more complex heuristic rules
to account for long-run expectations.
Figure 16 displays the standard deviation of individual predictions for the price
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Figure 10: Average long-run expectations of two representative groups in the neg-
ative feedback treatment for both experimental and simulated data. Blu, red and
green lines represent the average 2, 3 and 4 step-ahead predictions, respectively.
2, 3 and 4 periods ahead. It shows that the degree of coordination resulting from
the simulated data is fairly close to the degree of coordination of experimental
data. Additionally, the EEA is able to reproduce the more persistent heterogeneity
observed for the long-run predictions as compared to the degree of coordination of
the one-step-ahead predictions.
5 EEA with the fundamental value as anchor
From our analysis on how subjects form their expectations we observe that sub-
jects follow an anchor and adjustment mechanism where the anchor depends on
the feedback mechanism that drives the formation of market prices: in markets
with positive feedback subjects’ expectations are driven by the past market price
dynamics whereas, in markets with a negative feedback markets, subjects learn
the fundamental value and use it as anchor to form their short-run expectations
on the price. Table 7 illustrates our conclusion. We estimate two equations to
explain individual short-run expectations for the positive and negative feedback
treatments implemented in the laboratory experiments: in Model (1) we consider
as explanatory variables the lagged value of individual short-run expectations and
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Figure 11: Average long run expectations of two representative groups in the pos-
itive feedback treatment for both experimental and simulated data. Blu, red and
green lines represent the average 2, 3 and 4 step-ahead predictions, respectively.
Table 5: Mean squared error of simulated long-run predictions in both positive and
negative feedback treatments. We compute the average across groups quadratic
distance between the average long-run experimental and EEA simulated predic-
tions. Predictions are computed by using last observed price as an anchor.
Negative Positive
2step 3step 4step 2step 3step 4step
Group 1 2.46 5.16 4.97 0.23 0.59 1.21
Group 2 2.3 1.47 2.81 0.18 0.8 0.94
Group 3 0.3 2.88 3.66 0.26 0.5 1.07
Group 4 1.87 1.17 3.88 0.13 0.55 3.02
Group 5 0.89 0.77 0.93 0.38 0.52 1.18
Group 6 5.41 1.67 22.94 0.2 0.5 1.15
Group 7 2.06 1.31 2.06 1.03 2.37 5.23
Group 8 2.2 0.42 1.91 - - -
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Figure 12: Individual long-run predictions both real and simulated of Group 1 of
the negative feedback treatment from period 5 to period 10. The black dots are
the market price, the grey lines are the individual forecasts and the dashed line
represents the fundamental value.
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Figure 13: Individual long-run predictions both real and simulated of Group 1 of
the negative feedback treatment from period 11 to period 15. The black dots are
the market price, the grey lines are the individual forecasts and the dashed line
represents the fundamental value.
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Figure 14: Individual long-run predictions both real and simulated of Group 1 of
the positive feedback treatment from period 5 to period 10. The black dots are
the market price, the grey lines are the individual forecasts and the dashed line
represents the fundamental value.
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Figure 15: Individual long-run predictions both real and simulated of Group 1 of
the positive feedback treatment from period 11 to period 15. The black dots are
the market price, the grey lines are the individual forecasts and the dashed line
represents the fundamental value.
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Figure 16: Coordination: comparison between experimental and simulated data
of the average across groups of the mean absolute deviation of one, two, three and
four-step-ahead predictions per period for both positive and negative treatment.
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Figure 17: Convergence to the fundamental value: comparison between exper-
imental and simulated data of the average across groups of the mean absolute
deviation of one, two, three and four-step-ahead predictions per period for both
positive and negative treatment.
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Table 6: Mean squared error of simulated long-run predictions in both positive and
negative feedback treatments. We compute the average (across groups) quadratic
distance between the average long-run experimental and HSM simulated predic-
tions.
Negative Positive
2step 3step 4step 2step 3step 4step
Group 1 3.78 9.39 12.31 1.40 2.68 4.51
Group 2 2.42 10.09 13.35 0.05 0.59 0.25
Group 3 2.92 4.87 9.01 0.51 1.01 1.96
Group 4 4.69 7.90 9.08 1.20 2.71 3.95
Group 5 0.59 0.56 0.35 0.29 0.42 0.79
Group 6 10.48 19.64 34.03 1.14 2.37 3.66
Group 7 0.81 1.37 1.76 1.94 2.26 2.19
Group 8 3.05 6.41 6.97 - - -
market price. Instead, in Model (2) we use as explanatory variables past indi-
vidual short-run expectations and the fundamental value. Our results show that,
whereas Model (1) performs well in the two feedback mechanism showing the rele-
vance of past prices in the formation of expectations, Model (2) clearly highlights
the pivotal role of the fundamental value in determining short-run expectations
in negative feedback markets with a coefficient close to 1, compared to the role of
the fundamental price in the formation of short-run expectations in markets with
positive feedback (with a coefficient of 0.09).
Table 7: Dynamic panel regression of individual short-run expectations. Depen-
dent variable: individual short-run expectations. Standard errors in parentheses.
Positive Negative
Model(1) Model(2) Model(1) Model(2)
pt−1 0.77∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.70∗∗∗ (0.02)
ip
e
t−1,t−1 0.23
∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.02)
pf 0.09∗ (0.05) 0.99∗∗∗ (0.04)
ip
e
t−1,t−1 0.91
∗∗∗ (0.06) 0.01 (0.04)
N 798 798 912 912
Waldχ2 134952.46∗∗∗ 32720.83∗∗∗ 15010.52∗∗∗ 15494.63∗∗∗
Focusing now on individual expectations in the long-run, recall that the the
EEA was developed on the basis of the anchor-and-adjustment mechanism and the
33
choice of the right anchor is therefore crucial. Colasante et al. (2018c) show that,
using the market price as anchor in markets with positive feedback, they obtain
a fairly good replication of the subjects’ expectations elicited in the laboratory
experiment. In this work, they also compare the performance of the EEA with an
alternative model like the so-called noisy rational expectations, that is based on
the idea that subjects have homogeneous rational expectations.7 They conclude
that this model provides a good approximation of the expectations elicited in the
negative feedback treatment. However, even though (experimental) predictions in
markets with negative feedback quickly converge to the fundamental value, they
observe a persistent heterogeneity of expectations in the experimental data that is
not found in the simulated expectations.
In order to reproduce the main features typically observed in (experimental)
subjects’ expectations concerning heterogeneity and convergence of long-run ex-
pectations, we implement an alternative version of the EEA, where we use the
fundamental value as anchor.8 We compute then agents’ individual predictions
for different forecast horizons k, where k = 1, 2, 3, using the fundamental value
(instead of past market prices) as anchor. In other words, the fitness measure is
computed using eqs. (14) and (15) considering instead the fundamental value as
a reference point as follows:
iV˜j,t = (pf − iajt)2 + φs (ipet−1,t−1 − iajt)2 , (21)
iV˜
k
j,t = |pf − iakjt|+ φl |ipet−k−1,t−1 − iakjt| . (22)
Setting φ 6= 0 we are able to obtain heterogeneous predictions as a result of past
individual expectations. In order to illustrate our results, Figures 19 and 18 show as
an example the average of individual predictions two, three and four steps ahead in
two representative groups in market with positive and negative feedback. Table 8
displays the MSE comparing the experimental data and the simulated expectations
in markets with positive and negative feedback. The results obtained show that
the EEA with the fundamental value as anchor performs better to replicate, on
average, the experimental data in the markets with negative feedback compare to
its performance in the markets with positive feedback.
With these results we provide further evidence that subjects form their ex-
pectations following different rules depending on the feedback system. In markets
7In the EEA homogeneous rational expectations are implemented by setting the mean of the
probability distribution of each agent (i.e, iµ) equal to the fundamental value in the centre of
the range of actions. They then set φ = 0 and replace pt−1 with the fundamental value
8Note that we dot perform the same exercise for short-run predictions since the range of the
distribution is given by the standard deviation of the market price and we cannot compute a
variable range if we include the fundamental value as anchor.
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Figure 18: Average long run expectations in the negative feedback treatment.
with negative feedback, subjects’ expectations are mainly driven by the fundamen-
tal value, while in the positive feedback system the reference point is the market
price.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we present the results of the application of two adaptive learning
algorithms to describe the experimental data of a LtFEs, in which we elicit short
and long-run expectations. In particular, we ask to the subjects to submit their
predictions in two distinct environments: positive and negative feedback systems.
The main difference between those expectations’ feedback systems relies in the
sign of the relation between expectations and market price. The descriptive anal-
ysis shows that the dynamical properties of the predictions are markedly different
in terms of both coordination of expectations and convergence to the fundamen-
tal value. In order to understand the process of expectations’ formation in both
feedback systems, we consider two evolutionary learning algorithms: the Heuristic
Switching Model and the Exploration-Exploitation Algorithm. The main differ-
ence between these algorithms is that the HSM can be defined as “parametric”,
meaning that it is based on few predetermined heuristics, and the EEA is instead
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Figure 19: Average long run expectations in the positive feedback treatment.
Table 8: Mean squared error of simulated long run predictions in both positive
and negative feedback treatments. We compute the quadratic distance between the
average experimental and EEA simulated predictions. Predictions are computed
by using fundamental value as an anchor.
Negative Positive
2step 3step 4step 2step 3step 4step
Group 1 0.84 1.21 1.8 6.86 7.50 8.34
Group 2 0.48 0.61 0.7 29.30 74.54 69.84
Group 3 0.23 0.6 1.62 11.11 28.08 30.28
Group 4 3.59 3.61 5.33 8.71 25.33 28.59
Group 5 0.17 0.23 1.15 4.08 6.62 6.74
Group 6 0.65 0.97 0.73 3.07 8.62 11.65
Group 7 0.8 1.33 1.12 18.85 17.35 17.10
Group 8 0.23 0.34 0.37 - - -
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“non-parametric”, so that the predictions are chosen according to a specific prob-
ability distribution. The two algorithms are based on the common principle of
anchor and adjustment rule. Regarding short run predictions, we observe that
both algorithms perform well in replicating individual predictions. In order to
simulate long-run predictions, we have introduced a straightforward extension of
the HSM: a linear extrapolation of short-run predictions across different horizons.
A considerable difference emerges between the two algorithms: the linear extrap-
olation provide a good approximation of the main stylized facts in the positive
feedback treatment. In the negative feedback system, the coordination and con-
vergence properties are better explained by the EEA. Moreover, we have performed
an exercise to test whether a change in the anchor can lead to better results in
replicating the experimental data. We have considered as an alternative anchor
the fundamental value instead of the market price. This modification leads to
better simulation results in the negative feedback system, while in the positive
feedback market we obtain a worse performance. The comparison between such
different algorithms helps us to understand that the subjects form their expecta-
tions using different anchors. The EEA is a good and flexible tool to replicate
short and long-run predictions in both positive and negative feedback systems.
The linear extrapolation we have implemented in this paper as en extension of
the HSM to compute long-run expectations is not sufficiently flexible to capture
the behavior in the different feedback environments: a more complex structure is
needed to replicate the properties of long-run predictions, which is the focus of
future research.
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The instructions and the scree-shot are not intended to be published.
We include this information for the convenience of the referees.
A Instructions and Screenshot
[General instructions]
Welcome to the Laboratory of Experimental Economics! You are participating
in an experiment in which you will take decisions in a financial market. The
instructions are very simple but, please, read them carefully.
During the whole experiment you will play with experimental currency unit
(ECU) and, at the end of the experiment, your final profit, summed to the 3? for
the show-up fee, will be converted in Euro according to the following exchange
rate: 1 Euro=500 ECU. The total amount will be paid at the end of the exper-
iment by cash.
[Only in the positive feedback treatment]
You are a financial advisor to a pension fund that wants to invest an amount
of money to buy an asset. The pension fund will allocate its money between a
bank account which pays fix interest rate and a risky asset that pays dividends.
The allocation depends on your forecast on the evolution of the asset price. When
making your predictions remember that the asset price each period is affected:
positively by the dividend, negatively by the interest rate and positively by the
investors’ expectations on the asset price in that period.
Your task is to predict the price for 20 periods. In each period (t) you will
predict the price for all the remaining 20− t periods, that is, in period 1 you will
submit 20 predictions starting from the prediction about the price at the end of
period 1, in period 2 you will submit 19 predictions and so on. Your predictions
must be between 0 and 100.
In period 1 you will submit predictions having information only about the
interest rate and the average dividend. From period 2 on, you will have more
information: besides the interest rate and the average dividend, you will see a
graph with the time series of your past predictions and the time series of the market
prices. The green dots represent the time series of your one-step-ahead predictions,
while the blue dots represent the asset price in each period. Additionally, you will
see the values of those time series and the time series of all your past predictions.
Remember that in any period you will see the information about the asset price
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in the previous periods.
ı¨¿1
2
The interest rate will be equal to 5% and the mean dividend will be equal to
3.25 (or 3.5 depending on the session).
[Only in the negative feedback treatment]
You are an advisor to a firm that wants to buy a certain amount of a good.
In each period, the manager of the firm decides how many units of that good she
wants to buy with the aim to sell it in the next period. To take an optimal deci-
sion, the manager needs a good prediction of the market price in the next period.
The evolution of the market price will be as follows: if the demand for the good is
higher than the supply, the price will rise. Conversely, if the supply will be higher
than the demand, the price will decrease. The manger will take her decision based
on your predictions about the market price in given period: the higher (lower) is
the prediction, the higher (lower) will be the demand and, as a consequence, the
market price will fall (rise).
Your task is to predict the price for 20 periods. In each period (t) you will
predict the price for all the remaining 20-t periods, that is, in period 1 you will
submit 20 predictions starting from the prediction about the price at the end of
period 1, in period 2 you will submit 19 predictions and so on. Your predictions
must be between 0 and 100.
In period 1 you will submit predictions without any information about past
prices. From period 2 on, you will see a graph with the time series of your past
predictions and the time series of the prices. The green dots represent the time
series of your one-step-ahead predictions, while the blue dots represent the market
price in each period. Additionally, you will see the values of those time series and
the time series of all your past predictions. Remember that in any period you will
see the information about the market price of the previous periods.
[General instructions]
Once each subject has submitted her prediction for each period, the price will
be computed and it will be shown at the beginning of period 2. The same mecha-
nism will be used for subsequent periods. Once you and the other subjects submit
the predictions, the price as well as the profits will be computed according to the
forecasting accuracy.
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Remember that your profit depends on your forecasting accuracy. The lower
your forecasting error (the distance between your predictions and the price in a
given period), the higher will be your profit. Your profit will be computed at the
end of each period. Besides the profit for your one-step-ahead prediction each
period, you will receive an extra profit for your past predictions about the price
each period. This extra profit will be computed according to the following table:
Difference between price of
period t and your prediction for
period t
ECU
±5 25
±10 12
±15 5
At the beginning of each period you will see the profit for all the predictions
and the cumulative gains.
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A.1 Screenshot
Figure 20: Screen-shot of the experiment.
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